의견: 35명의 미국 하원의원들이 인도 IT 전문가들의 경력을 망칠 수 있는 법안을 추진했다

A group of Republicans wants to break the traditional F-1-to-H-1B-to-green-card path. The biggest casualty will be Indian students.

For thousands of Indian students and families in Bengaluru and Gurugram who have pledged assets for master's degrees in America, the US political climate in 2026 is crucial. Most follow a path: first the F-1 student visa, then Optional Practical Training (OPT), and later an H-1B work visa, aiming for a green card and citizenship. This process has let generations of Indians study, work, and settle in the US. Yet, this article argues that a US-based group wants to break this F-1-to-H-1B-to-green-card path. That would create a new reality for Indian talent. While the media focuses on H-1B quota cuts, about 35 members of the House Freedom Caucus are more influential. 

This coalition is led by Representative Paul Gosar of Arizona and Eli Crane, and they just wrote the End H-1B Visa Abuse Act of 2026. The bill suggests major changes: a three-year pause on new H-1B visas and a sharp cut in the annual cap from 65,000 (plus 20,000 for advanced degrees) to just 25,000. It replaces the lottery with a wage-based allocation, sets a minimum salary of $200,000, and bans third-party staffing or 'body shops' (a model where agencies supply IT or specialised professionals to companies, usually on a temporary basis). It also forbids H-4 dependent employment and prevents H-1B holders from moving to green cards, making the visa strictly temporary. Importantly, the bill would also end Optional Practical Training (OPT) entirely, including the STEM OPT extension. This marks a significant turning point for Indian students' pathways to the US workforce.

The Freedom Caucus is an invitation-only group of about 40 to 45 Republican lawmakers. It is the most organised restrictionist force in American politics today. To understand their impact, think of them as an insurgent group within a party. They are tactically ruthless and refuse to compromise, even with their own leaders. Their tactics have caused several government shutdowns. Under their influence, high-skilled immigration policy has moved from reform to elimination. They are loyal not to the US Chamber of Commerce or Silicon Valley's technology giants, but to a protectionist vision of the American labour market.

The first motivation is economic nationalism. It is based on a grievance that most Indian observers may not be aware of. Under US law, international students on OPT and their employers are exempt from Social Security and Medicare taxes. This gives employers who hire foreign graduates a 15.3% cost advantage over those hiring American graduates. Lawmakers like Byron Donalds of Florida and Andy Biggs of Arizona say the US government taxes companies for hiring American citizens but rewards them for hiring foreigners. With high student debt and stagnant wages for entry-level workers, this argument is powerful. It avoids the traditional merit debate.

The second motivation is a constitutional objection to OPT's origin. Congress never explicitly approved the programme. Instead, it grew out of administrative interpretations and executive regulations during the Bush and Obama years. For the Republican Party's legalist wing, including lawmakers like Chip Roy of Texas and Harriet Hageman of Wyoming, OPT was an executive branch mistake. Their effort to end it aims to restore Congress's authority. They argue that such a large guest-worker programme should require a direct legislative vote.

The third motivation is political positioning within a conservative movement that now opposes corporate America. Thirty-five lawmakers represent districts in Arizona, Wyoming, Tennessee, and Texas. Their constituents dislike globalisation and distrust multinational corporations. In these districts, visa programmes are seen as ways for firms like Google, Amazon, and large Indian IT companies to keep local wages low. Limiting OPT and H-1B aligns with growing desires to reduce corporate power. These lawmakers are secure in conservative districts and ignore industry lobbying. They get money from small grassroots donors and immigration-restrictionist groups, not Silicon Valley PACs. They do not worry about threats to the economy or loss of innovation. Their opposition to OPT and H-1B reflects changing power dynamics in American politics.

Indian observers need to see that the OPT fight is not just an isolated labour-market dispute; rather, it is part of a wider trend. For example, within ten days in April 2026, Vance urged college students in Georgia to ask Senate candidates to end the H-1B programme. At the same time, Crane introduced a 71-page bill proposing a three-year pause on visas, ending OPT and dependent visas, and setting a $200,000 salary floor. President Trump also recently dismissed the subcontinent in foul terms, resharing a post that called it a "hellhole", undoing two decades of diplomatic framing. While these actions were not coordinated, their timing emphasises a broader point: three centres of American power responded independently to domestic incentives that now reward anti-Indian positions. The OPT programme is targeted because it is the last entry point for Indian graduates into the American workforce. Closing it would complete a sequence started by H-1B restrictions and consular shutdowns.

For India, the effects are both immediate and long-term. In the short term, the student-to-work pipeline is immediately risky. Many students now consider Canada, the UK, and Australia, but these options are also narrowing. Canada capped student permits but still allows some clear study-to-work paths for in-demand skills. The UK tightened post-study work routes; long-term employment visas are hard to secure, though some technical and research roles remain attractive. Australia raised salary thresholds for skilled visas. This helps specialised, high-paid workers but blocks recent graduates and entry-level workers. Although these countries still offer more predictable systems than the US process does, shifting quotas, salary rules, and other policies can quickly close options. Western economies may no longer be open to Indian talent. Families must now carefully weigh the pros and cons. Alternatives exist, but competition is rising, and rules keep changing. Careful selection of programmes, individual backgrounds, and country-specific risks is now crucial.

Over time, these policies could shift global innovation power toward India. As opportunities in the US diminish, companies unable to bring talent to America may expand their research and development abroad. Silicon Valley branches in Bengaluru and Hyderabad are beginning to move from back-office work to advanced research and development. Thus, what the Freedom Caucus sees as protecting US jobs might, in fact, boost Indian innovation. Top talent either stays in India or returns sooner than planned.

Indian policymakers and institutions should adapt, not complain. The main argument is that recent OPT and visa changes reflect strong US domestic political shifts rather than isolated preferences, and that Indian stakeholders must respond accordingly. Specifically, they should strengthen local opportunities for skilled professionals, partner with the US and other countries to establish university branches in India, engage with schools and states that oppose the Freedom Caucus, and support institutions that welcome talent America rejects. For thirty years, sending educated youth to the West was India's strategy. But that era is over. Now, US lawmakers are re-evaluating human ties between the countries and see them as dispensable luxury. Indian families considering US universities in 2027 must understand the political motives attached to that choice, and Indian leaders must realise they can no longer outsource the dreams of Indian youth to America.

(The author is a Research Fellow in the Geostrategy Program at the Takshashila Institution)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

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