이란-미국 휴전에서 드러난 중국의 전략적 거리
China’s role in the Iran-US ceasefire reflects its strategic distance
South China Morning Post
Chenjie Song
EN
2026-04-09 12:30
Translated
4월 7일 도널드 트럼프 미국 대통령이 선언한 이란의 호르무즈 해협 재개방 기한이 2시간도 채 남지 않은 상황에서 파키스탄의 샤바즈 샤리프 총리가 제시한 2주간의 휴전안이 발표됐다. 이 합의는 이란이 4월 6일 파키스탄 중재자들을 통해 미국에 10개 항목의 제안서를 전달한 이후 나온 것이다.
이란 관계자들에 따르면 테헤란의 수락은 중국의 마지막 순간 중재 이후 이루어졌다. 이 돌파구는 중국과...
In taking a back seat in de-escalation efforts with Pakistan, China is decoupling its influence from responsibility
Despite reiterating its position with another partner, China has not changed its strategy and language since the war began on February 28. Choosing Pakistan to co-brand Beijing’s diplomacy is indicative of the messages China wants to send to its economic and political partners involved in the conflict and how it chooses to exercise influence.
Having Pakistan as the visible face of the mediation has paid off in ways that a unilateral Chinese effort would not have, as it signals simultaneous proximity to both sides of the conflict without the diplomatic exposure of direct involvement. Pakistan’s position in this conflict is unique. Islamabad serves as a backchannel between Beijing and Tehran at a moment when direct Chinese engagement with Iran would carry political costs Beijing is unwilling to absorb.
Through a joint effort with Islamabad, Beijing is able to borrow these credentials. The April 7 ceasefire, branded as Pakistan’s two-week proposal, allowed China’s reported leverage on Iran to be exercised without it becoming the political story. Pakistan is seen by the GCC as a security interlocutor and by Iran as a political channel, allowing Beijing to apply pressure on its political ally in Tehran and signal concern to its economic partners in the Persian Gulf through a single vehicle.
US and Iran agree to 2-week ceasefire amid Pakistani mediation efforts
Despite reiterating its position with another partner, China has not changed its strategy and language since the war began on February 28. Choosing Pakistan to co-brand Beijing’s diplomacy is indicative of the messages China wants to send to its economic and political partners involved in the conflict and how it chooses to exercise influence.
Having Pakistan as the visible face of the mediation has paid off in ways that a unilateral Chinese effort would not have, as it signals simultaneous proximity to both sides of the conflict without the diplomatic exposure of direct involvement. Pakistan’s position in this conflict is unique. Islamabad serves as a backchannel between Beijing and Tehran at a moment when direct Chinese engagement with Iran would carry political costs Beijing is unwilling to absorb.
Through a joint effort with Islamabad, Beijing is able to borrow these credentials. The April 7 ceasefire, branded as Pakistan’s two-week proposal, allowed China’s reported leverage on Iran to be exercised without it becoming the political story. Pakistan is seen by the GCC as a security interlocutor and by Iran as a political channel, allowing Beijing to apply pressure on its political ally in Tehran and signal concern to its economic partners in the Persian Gulf through a single vehicle.
US and Iran agree to 2-week ceasefire amid Pakistani mediation efforts